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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model to study the effect of income insecu-
rity of parents and offspring on the child’s residential choice. Parents are partially
altruistic toward their children and will provide financial help to an independent
child when her income is low relative to the parents’. We show that first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD) shifts in the distribution of the child’s future income
(or her parents’) will have ambiguous effects on the child’s residential choice. The
analysis identifies altruism as the source of ambiguity in the results. If parents are
selfish or the joint income distribution of parents and child places no mass on the
region where transfers are provided, a FOSD shift in the distribution of the child’s
(parents’) future income will reduce (raise) the child’s current income threshold
for independence.
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1 Introduction
The age at which children leave the parental home differs considerably across countries.
In 2002, for men aged 25 to 29 years old, some of the lowest coresidence rates in the
European Union (EU) could be found in France, the Netherlands and the UK, ranging
from 20 to 22%. In Italy, by striking contrast, the coresidence rate for the same group
was 73%. Other southern European countries shared the Italian record, such as Greece
(70%), Spain (67%), and, to a lesser extent, Portugal (58%). Perhaps surprising at first
sight, the coresidence rate in a Nordic country like Finland was amongst the highest in
Europe (73%). Similar disparities were present among women. Regarding time trends,
for the same age group of males, in the mid-1980s coresidence rates were approximately
50% in Italy, Greece, and Spain (and 38% in Portugal). Thus, there has been a sustained
upward trend in these five countries, with more stability in the remaining EU countries.
Early attention to household membership decisions — whether to stay at the parental
home or to live apart — can be found in McElroy (1985), where the joint determination
of labor supply participation and household membership is examined. Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993), study the properties of financial transfers from parents to their young
adult sons, as well as transfers in the form of shared residence, with particular attention
posed on the child’s accumulation of human capital. Other contributions include Ermisch
(1999), and Card and Lemieux (2000). This body of literature focusses on the effects
of the income of parents and children and of housing prices on the coresidence decisions
of youth. Regarding the southern European experience, Manacorda and Moretti (2005)
have emphasized the income of parents in Italy (who bribe their children to stay at
home), whereas housing costs were examined in Giannelli and Monfardini (2003), for
Italy, and in Martinez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002), for Spain. Giuliano (2004)
proposes a higher desirability of living at home due to the increased freedom for young
adults brought forth by the “sexual revolution” of the late 1960s.
In a companion empirical paper Becker, Bentolila, Fernandes and Ichino (2005a), we
focus on one factor which has not received much attention so far, namely the degree of job
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security enjoyed by youths and their parents. Using both panel data for Italy and macro
data for European Union countries, we estimate the effect of perceived job security on
coresidence. For Italy, we rely on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
Our measure of job insecurity comes from a direct question asked to the respondents of
the 1995 survey regarding their assessment of the probability of remaining employed (if
employed at the time) or of finding a job (if unemployed).1 We use the complement of
this probability, which we label p, and which corresponds to the probability of losing
one’s job or of becoming unemployed. Our empirical work provides estimates of the
impact of changes in p on the child’s probability of coresidence. After controlling for
a variety of demographic variables, we find strong and statistically significant effects of
parental perceived job insecurity on the child’s probability of becoming independent,
with perceived insecurity raising the probability of independence. Our macroeconomic
data comes from questionnaires collected by the European Commission’s Eurobarometer.
At the macro level, insecurity of both young and old affects coresidence in a strong and
statistically significant fashion. In the current paper, we propose a theoretical model to
study the conditions under which the aforementioned empirical results hold true.
In our model, parents are partially altruistic toward their children and will provide
financial help to an independent child when her income is low relative to the parents.
However, if a child coresides with her parents, we assume she will have access to a
greater share of total familial income than granted to her through financial transfers in
the state of independence. This assumption is rooted on the difficulty of excluding the
child from the consumption of public goods such as housing. Moving out is costly; in
fact, in our setup, moving out is irreversible.2 We consider two dimensions of income
insecurity, corresponding to shifts in the distribution of income in the sense of first- and
second-order stochastic dominance (abbreviated FOSD and SOSD, respectively). While
one well-known implication of FOSD shifts in the income distribution is for expected
1Endogeneity issues prevent us from using the child’s perceived job insecurity measure in the SHIW
as an additional regressor.
2We will argue later that this assumption carries no loss of generality as compared to finite moving
costs while providing substantial tractability gains.
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income to increase, under SOSD expected income is held constant and it is the variance
of the income process that declines.
We show that FOSD shifts in the distribution of the child’s future income (or her
parents’) will have ambiguous effects on the child’s residential choice. For income pairs
such that parents provide transfers to their independent children, higher income (ei-
ther the child’s or her parents’) raises the child’s consumption both at home and when
independent. Partially altruistic parents will only provide transfers to children whose
consumption is lower than their own. Therefore, when transfers are provided, if the
child or the parent’s income increase, while consumption at the parental home goes up
by more than consumption when independent, the marginal utility of an extra unit of
consumption is highest for an independent child. Consequently, for the range of income
values such that transfers are positive, the impact of the child’s higher income (or her
parents’) affects the differential utility across the two residential states in an ambiguous
way. Further, while some parameter values allow us to solve this ambiguity for one
family member, we show that the ambiguous effect of income on coresidence cannot be
simultaneously eliminated for both parent and child.
Our analysis identifies parental altruism as the very source of the ambiguous impact
of higher income on the child’s residential status. Absent altruism, since transfers will
no longer be given to independent children, the intuitive results that FOSD shifts in
the distribution of the child’s (parents’) future income reduce (raise) the child’s current
income threshold for independence do emerge. More generally, in the presence of altru-
ism, these results only hold true when the joint income distribution of parent and child
places no mass on the region where transfers are made. The altruism driven ambiguity
of income changes on the child’s residential status has implications for SOSD income
shifts, as well. Once again, unambiguous results only emerge for either selfish parents or
by confining attention to income distributions such that positive transfers do not take
place. In these cases, SOSD shifts in the distribution of the child’s (parents’) income
reduce (raise) the child’s income threshold for independence.3
3Our model also allows us to study the implications of the parent’s current income and family size
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To our knowledge, the first paper proposing (parental) job security as a determinant
of late youth emancipation is Fogli’s (2004). Other than our work, this is also the only
other reference we are aware of that explicitly considers job security as a determinant
of household membership decisions. While sharing the common concern of the effects
of job security on coresidence, our analysis and goals are very different. Fogli starts
from the interesting realization that countries with tight credit constraints also display
high coresidence rates and high degrees of employment protection. She then argues
that, given the credit constraints, employment protection for the parents is the outcome
of a bargaining process between the young and old generations. Using an overlapping
generations model, she studies the political economy environment of her economy under
general equilibrium, focusing on whether or not the institutional environment of real
economies may be an optimal outcome in the context of her model. Ours is a partial
equilibrium model that analyses the residential choice of one person at a time, and
considers this individual in its relations with her family members.
In the next section, we present our model and results. We then argue that the
empirical micro estimates in Becker et al. (2005a) are a valid test of the model and
support its predictions. Section 3 concludes.
2 A model of job insecurity and coresidence
In this section we illustrate how coresidence decisions are related to job insecurity of
parents and children using a dynamic, two-period model of residential choice. All proofs
can be found in Becker et al. (2005b).
2.1 The family
The family in our model has n0 parents and n1 + 1 children. We assume that it has
either one or two parents (“the parent” for short) and at least one child. Family size is
on coresidence. Since our main contribution concerns the effects of income security on coresidence, we
choose not to mention those here. These additional results are outlined at the end of section 2, where
we also discuss how they relate to the existing literature.
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denoted n (with n = n0 + n1 + 1). Our focus is on the residential choice of one of the
children, assuming that her siblings remain with the parents.
Direct utility is defined over consumption, only. We assume that, in the parental
home, all individuals pool income and consume an equal fraction of total family income.4
We root this assumption on the difficulty of excluding children from the consumption of
public goods in the household. If all family members are coresiding, then consumption
in the parental home is given by:
cnp =
yp + yc − γp
n
, (1)
where γp is the rent or the imputed cost of housing, yp parental income, and yc the
income of the child who is contemplating to move out (her siblings are assumed to earn
no income). We denote the child’s consumption by cc. If she stays, she gets c
n
p . If she
moves out, she will consume all of her income, net of housing costs under independence,
γc, plus a non-negative transfer t from her parents:
ci = yc + t− γc.
Per capita consumption of the family members of an independent child is:
cip =
yp − t− γp
(n− 1)
.
The child’s residential decision affects the way resources are divided in the family. By
moving out, there is one fewer person with whom to divide income in the parental
home, and there is also less income to share; further, an independent child may receive
a transfer from her parents. The child’s choice to become independent therefore also
modifies consumption of those who stay home.
In our model, parents are partially altruistic. They weigh their direct utility by a
factor λ ∈ (0.5, 1), and their children’s utility by only (1− λ). Parental utility is then:
Up = λ
(
n0 +
(1− λ)
λ
n1
)
u (cp) + (1− λ) u (cc) , (2)
4Considering different sharing rules, provided that consumption of individual family members were
monotonic in income, would not change our qualitative results.
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In what follows, we will in fact use the slightly modified functional form:
Up = λ (n0 + n1)u (cp) + (1− λ) u (cc) = λ (n− 1)u (cp) + (1− λ)u (cc) , (3)
which puts more weight on the utility of the n1 children who always remain at home and
simplifies the algebra significantly, while leaving our results qualitatively unchanged.
To obtain sharper results, we conduct our analysis using Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) for the direct utility from consumption: u (c) = (1 − α)−1c1−α, with
α > 0.5
2.2 Timing
There are two periods. In period 1, parent and child observe their income realizations,
yp1 and yc1. To ensure nonnegative consumption, we assume there is a lower bound on
income realizations given by the housing costs, γp and γc. A positive income realization
for the parent, interpreted as a draw of yp1 > γp, is equivalent to a job offer, and similarly
for the child. Since there is no disutility from work, job offers are always accepted.6 The
child then decides whether or not to move out. Finally, consumption takes place as a
function of the residential choice of the child.
The main difference across periods comes from assuming that moving out is irre-
versible. This can be justified on the grounds that the direct costs from moving, as well
as the social stigma attached to going back to the parental house, tend to make indepen-
dence a rather permanent state. While qualitatively similar results would emerge from
considering finite costs instead, irreversibility is of great analytical convenience. For a
child who stayed with her parents in period 1, the period 2 timing of events and choices
repeats itself. If the child has moved out in period 1, however, she faces no residential
choice in period 2.
5The results generalize to other commonly used families of functions (such as the Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion case).
6Family member j would require a positive income threshold above γj before accepting a job offer if
there were disutility from work or if individuals were productive while unemployed (through household
production, say). We are ignoring these cases.
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2.3 Period 2
We now characterize the resource allocation and residential decision in period 2. Assum-
ing that the incomes of parent and child have taken the values yp2 and yc2, the optimal
transfer the parent would give the child if she decided to move out solves the following
problem:
max
t2≥0
{
λ (n− 1) u
(
yp2 − t2 − γp
(n− 1)
)
+ (1− λ) u (yc2 + t2 − γc)
}
. (4)
First-order conditions yield:
λu′
(
cip2
)
≥ (1− λ)u′ (ci2) ,
holding with equality when t2 > 0. Since λ > 0.5, this implies that a transfer-receiving
child has lower consumption than the remaining family members. If she has not moved
out in period 1, a child whose income is low enough to trigger transfers will therefore
prefer not to move out. For such a child, consumption at home will be higher for two
reasons. At home she gets the higher fraction 1/n of total familial income compared to
a smaller fraction when independent.7 In fact, the sharing rule in place at the parental
home, where each individual gets the fraction 1/n of total income net of rent, corresponds
to the case of full altruism (λ = 0.5). By staying home, children are able to secure
consumption of certain goods since parents cannot limit the child’s consumption of
those goods; when the child leaves, on the other hand, parental transfers represent fully
voluntary payments to the child and, as such, reflect the partial nature of altruism. The
second reason why the child’s consumption will be higher if she stays home is the fact
that, by doing so, the family’s aggregate resources net of housing costs are higher as
only one rental payment is made.
We now address the moving out decision for the child who decided to stay at home in
period 1. Define ∆2 as the excess utility level when independent relative to coresiding,
for period 2:
∆2 (yc2, yp2) ≡ u (ci2)− u
(
cnp2
)
.
7When independent, she gets the fraction (Γ (n− 1) + 1)−1 of total familial income, with Γ =
(λ/ (1− λ))
1
α > 1. It can be shown that 1/n > (Γ (n− 1) + 1)
−1
.
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∆2 is a function of the income realizations of parent and child in the current period.
8 The
child moves out if ∆2 > 0. If indifferent, ∆2 = 0, we assume she stays.
9 Understanding
the child’s residential choice and how it is affected by changes in yp2 and yc2 crucially
hinges on the properties of this function. We first address how different values of yc2
impact the child’s residential choice and later address the effects of parental income.
How does ∆2 change as a function of yc2? To answer this question, it is important
to define two income thresholds. Define ỹc2 as the value such that parental transfers
are zero, t2 (ỹc2) = 0,
10 and let ȳc2 be the income value that makes the child indifferent
between staying at the parental home or moving out, ∆2 (ȳc2) = 0. Under CRRA
preferences,
ỹc2 =
yp2 − γp
Γ (n− 1)
+ γc, ȳc2 =
yp2 − γp
n− 1
+
n
n− 1
γc, (5)
with Γ = (λ/ (1− λ))
1
α > 1. It is easy to see that ȳc2 exceeds ỹc2.
Lemma 1 below characterizes formally how ∆2 depends on the child’s income.
Lemma 1 (Utility differential and the child’s income) The function ∆2 (yc2) is
strictly negative for yc2 ∈ [γc, ȳc2) and strictly positive for yc2 > ȳc2. Further, ∆2 (yc2) is
strictly increasing in the range (ỹc2, ȳc2). When the relative-risk aversion parameter α
exceeds 1, ∆2 (yc2) is strictly increasing for yc2 ∈ (γc, ỹc2). When α is below 1, ∆2 (yc2)
is strictly increasing for yc2 > ȳc2.
Figure 1A depicts a possible configuration of ∆2 (yc2). As Lemma 1 shows, utility
8As such, ∆2 (·) is defined over [γc,∞)×
[
γp,∞
)
.
9It can be shown that, at the child’s independence threshold, yc2 = ȳc2, the consumption of her
family members is strictly lower if she becomes independent relative to the child staying home. As
such, her family members would like to persuade the child to stay home. We choose not to consider this
possibility for two reasons. First, the quantitative difference in consumption for the family members
across the child’s residential states, which totals γc/ (p (n− 1)), is likely to be small; for small γc and
large n, it will be negligible. Further, as the child’s income and corresponding independence surplus
increase, the benefits to the remaining family members from persuading the child to stay will decrease.
Second, we take the view that compensating the child who threatens to leave may be difficult or even
impossible. In fact, consumption entails sharing a house and possibly other public goods, as well. It
may not be possible to give the child a larger share of the family’s resources, or it may be too costly to
do so (consider tearing down walls to make the child’s room bigger...). In this sense, the sharing rule
prevailing at the parental home is understood as a technology for sharing income.
10The notation tj (x) omits, for simplicity, other arguments of the function tj (·). Similar simplifica-
tions will be used for ∆2 (·) and other functions, throughout.
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from independence exceeds that under coresidence for yc2 ≥ ȳc2. Thus, a child who did
not move out in period 1, will now leave if her income exceeds ȳc2; otherwise she will
stay. The set of income values [γc, ȳc2] is a regret region: the child would prefer to go
back home. As explained above, the sources of regret are the rental cost γc and partial
altruism.
The dependence of the residential choice on yp2 is also of interest. Define ỹp2 as the
level of parental income such that t2 (ỹp2) = 0, and ȳp2 as the parental income level
that leaves the child indifferent between moving out and coresiding, ∆2 (ȳp2) = 0. It is
straightforward to show that ȳp2 < ỹp2. Then,
Lemma 2 (Utility differential and the parent’s income) The function∆2 (yp2) is
strictly decreasing for yp2 ∈
[
γp, ỹp2
)
and strictly negative for yp2 > ȳp2. For yp2 ≥ ỹp2,
when the relative-risk aversion parameter α exceeds unity, ∆2 (yp2) is strictly increasing.
In Figure 1B we depict a possible configuration for ∆2 (yp2). Whether or not ∆2
(
γp
)
is positive depends on parameter values (specifically, a large number of family members
n and a small rental cost γc make ∆2
(
γp
)
positive). As Lemma 2 shows, however,
for yp2 > ȳp2, ∆2 (yp2) < 0 holds unambiguously, and children of wealthy parents who
stayed home will not move out. Just as with ∆2 (yc2), higher parental income does not
necessarily raise the child’s willingness to stay home.
The potential lack of monotonicity of the function∆2 (·) and the general configuration
of this function are of great relevance for our results. In section 2.4, we discuss these
properties in great detail and provide some intuition for the general results of Lemmas
1 and 2.
In Figure 2, we plot the curves ỹc2 and ȳc2 in (yc, yp) space. To the right of the
ȳc2 (yp2) schedule, the child moves out; to the left she stays. From the point of view of
the moving-out decision taken in period 1, we can also divide the coresidence area into
two parts. To the left of ỹc2 (yp2), children who became independent in period 1 will
receive a transfer, i.e. t2 (yc2, yp2) > 0, while to the right they will not. Recall that the
coresidence area is a regret area.
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2.4 Period 1
A simplified presentation of the model’s structure is given in Figure 3. In period 1
the residential choice is more involved than in period 2 due to irreversibility and the
possibility of regret. Naturally, the latter depends on the likelihood that period 2 incomes
will fall to the left of the schedule ȳc2 (yp2), in the regret region. We assume that
(yc2, yp2) ∼ F (yc2, yp2), where F (·) is the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf)
of period 2 income (yc2, yp2), with marginal cdfs Fc (yc2) and Fp (yp2). F (·) has support
over [γc,∞)×
[
γp,∞
)
.
Let R denote the regret region.11 If F (·) assigns positive probability to R, staying
home in period 1 has an option value, the value associated with waiting to see the
realization of the period 2 income and deciding then whether or not to move out. Just
like with any real option, this value has to be weighted against the potential gains from
moving out early on.
Define ∆1 as the expected excess utility from moving out relative to staying home in
period 1, conditional on making the optimal residential choice in period 2:
∆1 (yc1, yp1) ≡ u (ci1) +
∫
γp
∫
γc
u (ci2) dF (yc2, yp2)
−
{
u
(
cnp1
)
+
∫
γp
[∫ ȳc2(yp2)
γc
u
(
cnp2
)
dFc (yc2|yp2) +
∫ ∞
ȳc2(yp2)
u (ci2) dFc (yc2|yp2)
]
dFp (yp2)
}
.
∆1 is defined over the period one incomes of parent and child.
12
The first two terms in ∆1 represent the expected utility from moving out in period 1.
Given that the child becomes independent in period 1, period 2 utility is also computed
for cc2 = ci2. The terms preceded by a minus sign represent the expected utility from
staying home in period 1. In this case, the child retains the possibility of choosing the
best residential arrangement in period 2. Thus, given yp2, for yc2 ≤ ȳc2 (yp2), the child
11The regret region is formally defined as:
R ≡
{
(yc2, yp2) ∈ [γc,∞)×
[
γp,∞
)
: yc2 ≤ ȳc2 (yp2)
}
.
12As such, it is defined over the same domain as ∆2, the set [γc,∞)×
[
γp,∞
)
.
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remains with her parents and cc2 = c
n
p2; otherwise she moves out and cc2 = ci2. The
child will move out if ∆1 > 0. When yc2 > ȳc2 (yp2), having moved out in period 1 does
not carry any utility loss; therefore, in this range, the terms concerning period 2 utility
while independent cancel out and the moving out condition — ∆1 > 0 — simplifies to:
u (ci1)− u
(
cnp1
)
>
∫
γp
[∫ ȳc2(yp2)
γc
(
u
(
cnp2
)
− u (ci2)
)
dFc (yc2|yp2)
]
dFp (yp2) . (6)
It is worth examining equation (6) in detail. First of all, the right-hand side is
nonnegative. It represents the difference between expected utility under coresidence
and under independence, i.e. the gain in expected utility associated with waiting for
period 2 before choosing whether or not to move out. This is the option value. It will
be strictly positive if the cdf F (·) places strictly positive mass on the regret region.
The left-hand side represents the difference in period 1 utility from being independent
relative to moving out. The child will move out when this gain exceeds the expected
benefit from waiting. Note that the left-hand side is a difference between the within-
period utility across residential states. It can be shown that this difference corresponds
exactly to the function ∆2 (·), only now the arguments of ∆2 are the first-period incomes
of child and parent.13 The results outlined in Lemmas 1 and 2, showed how ∆2 (·) varied
with second-period incomes. Those results carry over to period 1, establishing how the
left-hand side of equation (6) varies with first-period incomes.
Define R̄ as the expected value of regret, the difference in expected utility between
the best residential state (coresidence) and independence over the regret area. (R̄ is a
notational shortcut to represent the right-hand side of (6)). Let ȳc1 denote the first-
period income threshold such that the child is exactly indifferent between staying at the
parental income or moving out. This income level is such that (6) holds at equality:
∆2 (ȳc1, yp1) = R̄. (7)
13The equivalence between the left-hand side of (6) and ∆2 (·) follows from noticing that the transfer
function that governs transfers from parents to children in period 1, t (yc1, yp1), is identical to the
function previously derived for period 2, t (yc2, yp2), once period-two incomes are replaced with period-
one income values.
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We now discuss the determination of ȳc1.
It is useful to begin by recalling how the child’s second period indifference threshold
ȳc2 was determined and comparing it to (7). In the second period, the child simply
evaluates the differential in utilities across residential states and, if she has not moved
out in period 1, chooses to live where utility is highest. If ∆2 (yc2, yp2) > 0, she moves
out, otherwise she stays, and ȳc2 is such that she is just indifferent: ∆2 (ȳc2) = 0. In
period 1, as illustrated in (7), she will require that utility while independent exceed
coresidence utility by a strictly positive amount, R̄. Therefore, while ȳc2 was determined
as the child’s second period income that set ∆2 equal to zero, ȳc1 is now the value of
the child’s first-period income that sets ∆2 equal to R̄. In view of the possibility of
regret, in the first-period the child will demand that independence be strictly better
than coresidence. Graphically, if we go back to Figure 1A, ȳc2 was found by identifying
the intercept of ∆2 with the horizontal axis while ȳc1 is now given by the intersection
of ∆2 with a horizontal line lying strictly above that axis. This discussion intuitively
shows that the child’s first-period moving out threshold will exceed ȳc2 if and only if R̄
is positive. Further, according to Lemma 1, if α < 1, the function ∆2 is monotonically
increasing for yc1 values that exceed ȳc2, and there is only one income value ȳc1 that
satisfies ∆2 (ȳc1) = R̄. This discussion informally establishes the following result:
Proposition 3 (Expected regret and moving-out decision) The period 1 moving-
out threshold correspondence ȳc1 (yp1), on (yc1, yp1) space, lies strictly to the right of the
corresponding period 2 schedule ȳc2 (yp2) if and only if F (R) > 0. When α < 1, ȳc1 (yp1)
is single-valued.
In what follows, we assume α < 1. Below, we discuss alternative ways of ensuring
that ∆2 (·, yp2) is strictly monotone for yc2 ≥ ȳc2. Further, we also confine attention to
the case when R̄ is strictly positive (for otherwise the moving-out decision in period 1
would be identical to that of period 2).
Our next step is to characterize how the child’s residential choice depends on future
income, hers and her parent’s. For example, if the child suddenly received the good
12
news that her expected income in period 2 were going to be higher, would ȳ1 increase
or decrease? What if the good news were about her parent’s income instead? We will
consider two types of changes in the distribution of future income values; specifically, we
will allow the distributions of future income to shift in the sense of first- and second-order
stochastic dominance.
First-Order Stochastic Dominance Shifts in the distribution of future incomes
affect the residential choice as described in (7) to the extent that they modify the ex-
pected value of regret, R̄. In turn, R̄ is the (negative of the) expected value of the values
of ∆2 over income pairs (yc2, yp2) in the regret area. For example, say that yp2 is in
fact constant. Then, R̄ equals (minus) the expectation of the values of ∆2 for yc2 in
the interval [γc, ȳc2]. Figure 1A shows one configuration for ∆2. While in that Figure
∆2 is strictly monotonic over the relevant interval, this need not be the case at all, as
Lemma 1 illustrates. If ∆2 were monotonically increasing over the regret area, it would
be straightforward to show that a shift in the distribution of the child’s future income
in the first-order stochastic sense would reduce R̄ and, as a consequence, reduce ȳc1, as
well. Since our results hinge crucially on the lack of monotonicity of ∆2 (·) in the range
yc ∈ [γc, ȳc2], we next go over the factors that determine the slope of ∆2 in some detail.
Since ∆2 corresponds to a difference in utility levels, changes in income affect this
difference in two ways. First, income modifies consumption differently depending on the
residential state. For example, for yc2 values such that no transfers would be provided to
the child (i.e. above ỹc2), higher yc2 implies that ci2 is changing by the same amount as
income whereas the increment in consumption at the parental home is only the fraction
1/n of the change in income. We label the impact of income changes on the child’s
consumption as the sharing effect. This, however, is not sufficient to ensure that ∆2
varies positively with yc2. The impact on ∆2 depends also on the marginal utility that
these changes in consumption entail. If, for example, ci2 > c
n
p2, the marginal utility of
consumption at home is higher than under independence. In the range yc2 > ȳc2, this
marginal utility effect counteracts the greater change in ci2 relative to c
n
p2. Consequently,
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although we know that ci2 will always exceed c
n
p2 provided yc2 > ȳc2, we cannot be certain
that ∆2 is always positively sloped in this range. When yc2 ∈ (ỹc2, ȳc2), by contrast,
both effects go in the same direction, ensuring that ∆2 is positively sloped. As discussed
above, α < 1 is a sufficient condition to obtain the strict monotonicity of ∆2 with respect
to yc2, when yc2 > ȳc2. More generally, what is needed is that, for high consumption
values — high enough to justify independence — the income effect outweighs the marginal
utility effect. This is a plausible assumption since marginal utility from consumption at
home is likely to be close to that under independence when consumption is high in both
residential states.
For yc2 < ỹc2, parents give transfers to independent children. Given partial altruism
and housing costs, we know the child experiences lower consumption while independent
relative to coresidence. Further, an extra dollar of the child’s income will be shared with
her family through a reduction in parental transfers. Under partial altruism, consump-
tion while independent will increase by less than the consumption the child would attain
if she were at the parental home. However, since the child is worse of when indepen-
dent, the marginal utility effect indicates that one unit of extra consumption will raise
the utility of an independent child the most. For yc2 ∈ [γc, ỹc2], we have sharing and
marginal utility effects going in opposite directions.
There are reasonable assumptions that would allows us to solve the ambiguity from
the effects of higher income over ∆2, in the positive transfer region. For example, we
could assume that the the marginal utility effect dominates for low income values. In
fact, for low income, it is likely that the marginal utility effect will assume an important
role in the comparison of utilities across residential states since CRRA preferences satisfy
Inada conditions. This assumption does ensure that ∆2 (yc2) is monotonically increasing
and, as a consequence, that R̄ decreases for a first-order shift in the child’s second period
income distribution. As a function of the child’s income, ∆2 (·) would qualitatively
look like Figure 1A. Interestingly, this assumption coupled with altruism then causes
monotonicity to fail when we consider∆2 (·) as a function of parental income, as depicted
in Figure 1B. The reason is that, for altruistic parents, higher parental income will
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also affect the child’s independence utility provided the child is poor enough to receive
transfers. For income low enough to trigger transfers, an extra dollar of parental income
will have exactly the same impact over the utility differential — independence minus
coresidence — as an extra dollar of the child’s income. In fact, when transfers are positive,
parents effectively choose the child’s consumption by selecting the amount of the transfer
they are giving her. The optimal choice of consumption, for yc and yp values that trigger
transfers, depends only on the sum yc + yp and not on its individual parcels. This is an
instance of Ricardian Equivalence type of neutrality results. This implies that, while for
yp2 < ỹp2, higher parental income will unambiguously reduce the utility differential from
independence (as a function of yp2, ∆2 is strictly decreasing as illustrated in Figure 1B),
for values of yp2 that exceed ỹp2 so that positive transfers occur, the slope of ∆2 (yp2)
will equal the slope of ∆2 (yc2) and, according to the configuration displayed in Figure
1A, raise it.
This discussion informally establishes the result that, if ∆2 (·) is monotonic in the
child’s income, such monotonicity will fail when we consider ∆2 (·) as a function of
parental income. We formalize this result as follows:
Lemma 4 (Altruism and the lack of monotonicity in differential utility) For
λ ∈ [0.5, 1), if the function ∆2 (·, yp2) is strictly monotonic with respect to the child’s
income, then ∆2 (yc2, ·) cannot be strictly monotonic with respect to the parent’s income.
The converse is also true: if ∆2 (yc2, ·) is strictly monotonic with respect to the parent’s
income, then ∆2 (·, yp2) cannot be strictly monotonic with respect to the child’s income.
When λ = 1, parents are selfish and place no value on the child’s utility. This is
one instance where the monotonicity of ∆2 (·) with respect to both the child and the
parent’s income can be obtained and we discuss this case below.
Given Lemma 4, unambiguous results concerning the impact of shifts in the dis-
tribution of future incomes in the first-order stochastic sense can only be obtained by
considering the subset of distributions of (yc2, yp2) that place no mass on the subset of
R where transfers are positive. This is summarized in the following propositions.
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Let F be the set of all pairs of independent distributions functions (Fc, Fp) with
support over ([yc,∞) , [yp,∞)), such that no mass is placed on the positive-transfer
subset of the regret region. Then:
Proposition 5 (FOSD in the child’s income) Let
(
F 1p , Fc
)
and
(
F 2p , Fc
)
be two el-
ements of F , and assume that F 1p first-order stochastically dominates F
2
p . Let the period
1 moving-out threshold corresponding to F jp be denoted ȳc1
(
F jp
)
. Then, when α < 1,
ȳc1
(
F 1p
)
≥ ȳc1
(
F 2p
)
.
Proposition 6 (FOSD in the parent’s income) Let (Fp, F
1
c ) and (Fp, F
2
c ) be two el-
ements of F , and assume that F 1c first-order stochastically dominates F
2
c . Let the period
1 moving-out threshold corresponding to F jc be denoted ȳc1 (F
j
c ). Then, when α < 1,
ȳc1 (F
1
c ) ≤ ȳc1 (F
2
c ).
Next, we briefly sketch how our results would change in two scenarios, the opposing
cases of full altruism (λ = 0.5), and of no altruism (λ = 1). Under full altruism, an
extra dollar of income (either the parent’s or the child’s) would have the same impact
on the child’s consumption irrespective of her residential choice.14 As such, there is no
differential sharing effect. This ensures that ∆2 (yc2) is unambiguously positively sloped
for yc2 ≤ ỹc2, and that ∆2 (yp2) is also positively sloped for yp2 ≥ ỹp2. While proposition
6 could be generalized to consider any joint distribution F (·) (and not only those who
place no mass over the positive-transfer subset of the regret area), the same ambiguity
as above would emerge when considering the effects of parental income on coresidence.
Therefore, results in this case would be qualitatively similar to those in Propositions 5
and 6, above.
If parents were completely selfish, transfers would never be given out and the child
would only be able to share the income of her family members under coresidence. In the
case of selfish parents, the transfer region vanishes and ỹc2 coincides with γc. From the
point of view of Figure 1A, the interval [γc, ỹc2) ceases to exist and, from Lemma 1, it
14As mentioned earlier, the sharing rule prevailing at the parental home is equivalent to full altruism.
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follows that ∆2 (yc2) is strictly increasing for yc2 ∈ [ỹc2, ȳc2] (sharing and marginal utility
effects work in the same direction, here). Further, ∆2 (yp2) would also be monotonically
decreasing everywhere (the threshold ỹp2 becomes infinity, now). An unintuitive conclu-
sion follows from the comparison of the altruism versus nonaltruism cases, the fact that
altruism is the source of the potential ambiguity in the effects of shifts in the distribution
of future incomes of parent and child. Absent altruism, the intuitive result that higher
expected income of the child makes her more willing to leave (lower ȳc1) and that higher
expected income of the parent has the opposite effect (higher ȳc1) would follow.
An additional comparison concerning the intensity of parental altruism is possible.
Children of more altruistic parents will receive higher transfers when independent than
children of less altruistic progenitors. Consequently, consumption while independent in
the positive-transfer income region will always be negatively related to λ, the degree of
parental selfishness, and the utility differential between independence and staying home
will be less negative for children of more altruistic parents, in this region. (For income
pairs outside the positive-transfer region, the utility differential across residential states
is independent of λ.) Consequently, for children of more altruistic parents, regret will
be less severe. It follows that the income threshold for independence for these children
is lower than for those with more selfish progenitors.
Second-Order Stochastic Dominance We have seen how income insecurity, as mea-
sured by FOSD, affects the child’s residential choice. One well-known implication of
FOSD is higher expected income (but possibly also higher income variance). By looking
now at second-order stochastic dominance shifts (SOSD) in the income distribution, we
hold the expected value of income constant and see instead what happens when only the
variance changes. We say that F 1c (y) dominates distribution F
2
c (y) in the second-order
stochastic sense if: i)
∫
yF 1 (y) dy =
∫
yF 2 (y) dy, and ii)
∫ yc
γc
[F 1 (z)− F 2 (z)] dz ≤ 0,
with the inequality holding for all yc in the domain of the child’s income.
15 Once again,
15The results associated with first- and second-order stochastic dominance require the additional
assumption that income is bounded. That is, yp2 ≤ y∗p < ∞ and yc2 ≤ y
∗
c < ∞ , so that Fp
(
γp
)
=
Fc (γc) = 0 and Fp
(
y∗p
)
= Fc (y
∗
c ) = 1. We omit making this assumption explicit for simplicity.
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the lack of monotonicity in ∆2 (yc) and ∆2 (yc) has implications for the concavity of
these functions over the positive-transfer region. In order to get unambiguous results,
we are forced to restrict our results to income distributions that place no mass on that
part of the income domain. For the child, we get the following result:
Proposition 7 (SOSD in the child’s income) Let (Fp, F
1
c ) and (Fp, F
2
c ) be two ele-
ments of F such that F 1c dominates F
2
c in the second-order stochastic sense. Then, when
α < 1, ȳc1 (F
1
c ) ≤ ȳc1 (F
2
c ).
Under some conditions, a similar result can be obtained for SOSD shifts of parental
income. However, since changes in the distribution of income affect the period 1 moving
out threshold only to the extent that they affect period 2 income values within the regret
area, for the parent’s income we need to ensure that the distribution of his income shifts
so as to lower the variance of income values in that region specifically, as opposed to
the requirement that it becomes less volatile over its global range.16 That is, if F 1p
dominates F 2p in the second-order stochastic sense, we need additionally to impose that,
for all values of the child’s income yc2,
∫ ȳp2(yc2)
γp
F 1p (yp2) dyp2 =
∫ ȳp2(yc2)
γp
F 2p (yp2) dyp2 = 0, (8)
which, together with the conditions that ensure the second-order stochastic dominance
of F 1p over F
2
p , implies: ∫ yp2
ȳp2(yc2)
[
F 1p − F
2
p
]
dyp2 ≤ 0,
for all yp2 ≥ ȳp2 (yc2).
We may then state:
16For the child, the SOSD requirement that income becomes less volatile over its entire domain
necessarily implies that it also becomes less volatile over the no-transfer part of the regret region. The
reason is that, for the child, the no transfer region coincides with the lowest possible realizations of
the child’s income. As such, the requierement that
∫ yc
γc
[
F 1 (yc)− F 2 (yc)
]
dyc ≤ 0 must also hold for
any income value yc in the regret region. For the parent, the regret region occurs for high yp values.
Therefore, the requirement
∫ yp
γp
[
F 1 (yp)− F
2 (yp)
]
dyp ≤ 0 does not imply that the latter condition
holds within the regret region. That is, SOSD does not imply, for y within the regret region, that
∫ y
ȳp[
F 1 (yp)− F 2 (yp)
]
dyp ≤ 0 holds.
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Proposition 8 (SOSD in the parent’s income) Let
(
F 1p , Fc
)
and
(
F 2p , Fc
)
be two
elements of F satisfying equation (8), such that F 1p dominates F
2
p in the second-order
stochastic sense. Then, when α < 1, ȳc1
(
F 1p
)
≥ ȳc1
(
F 2p
)
.
The same generalizations concerning the degree of altruism stated for FOSD carry
over to SOSD. Specifically, under full altruism, the results would be qualitatively similar
to propositions 7 and 8 (and income distributions would have to be restricted so as to
place no mass on the positive transfer region). If the parents were selfish, provided condi-
tion (8) held, then shifts in the SOSD sense of the child’s (parents’) income distribution
would unambiguously lower (raise) the first-period income moving-out threshold.
Additional Results While the main focus of the paper is the impact of income in-
security on the child’s residential decision, our model allows us to make additional pre-
dictions. We list below comparative static results concerning the impact of first-period
parental income, yp1, and family size, n, on the child’s first-period moving-out thresh-
old.17
Lemma 9 (Parental income and coresidence) When α < 1, higher period 1 parental
income yp1 raises the child’s moving-out threshold ȳc1 (yp1).
Lemma 10 (Family size and coresidence) When α < 1 and λ = 0.5 (very altruistic
parents), for n+ > n, the first period moving-out threshold is lower for a member of a
more numerous family than the corresponding threshold for a child belonging to a smaller
family:
ȳn+1 < ȳ
n
1 .
17Concerning the effects of parental income, our results relate to Ermisch (1999) as follows. He studies
coresidence choices under a static model, and considers both selfish and altruistic parents. Under the
former case, parents charge the child for living at home. Coresidence is beneficial for the child since she
gets to share housing, a public good. The child’s utility when independent limits the amount of “rent”
that the parents can charge her. When parental income increases, parents consume more of both direct
consumption goods and housing. Since they provide a bigger house to the child, they also raise the rent
they charge her. This reduces the probability of the child remaining at home. In our setup, Lemma 9
would go through even in the case of selfish parents: given our the technology for sharing resources at
home, the child still benefits from higher consumption when coresiding if her parents’ income goes up.
The predictions of our model and those in Ermisch coincide when altruistic parents are considered.
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Reversible Independence (or Finite Moving Costs) We assumed independence
to be an irreversible state. An alternative but fully equivalent interpretation is for the
cost of moving back home to be infinite. How would our results change if the child could
pay some finite cost φ in order to go back to the parental home?
Second-period decisions would not change, naturally. As for the first-period, the
possibility of going back home would imply that the child would not wish to remain
independent for second-period income realizations associated with a very negative value
of ∆2. Under the configuration of ∆2 displayed in Figure 1A, these would be associated
with the lowest income realizations for the child. Given that the child could exercise her
option of returning home (and would do so for φ sufficiently small and yc2 sufficiently
low), expected regret R̄ would now be strictly lower than before. FOSD and SOSD
results would follow just as before, also with the same caveats as before — caveats that
have to do with the lack of strict monotonicity in both ∆2 (·, yp2) and ∆2 (yc2, ·). Our
algebra and analysis could therefore fully accommodate φ. We choose to stick to infinite
moving costs only for the sake of analytical simplicity.
Companion Empirical Analysis As mentioned earlier, in Becker et al.(2005a), we
estimate the effect of perceived parental income insecurity on the child’s probability of
staying home. We explore the panel dimension of the Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) and follow families in two consecutive sample dates, 1995 and 1998.
In 1995, respondents were asked to state the probability they assigned to keeping their
current job, if they were employed, or of finding a new job, if unemployed. We use the
complement of this probability, which we label p. Our empirical work provides estimates
of the impact of changes in p on the child’s probability of coresidence. The dependent
variable is a 0-1 indicator of whether a child was still home in 1998, given that she
was home in 1995. In the regressions, we use other controls as well: father’s age and
schooling, gender of the child, number of siblings, and measures of housing prices, among
others.
The model presented in the current paper predicts that, provided financial transfers
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do not take place between parents and their adult children, shifts in the FOSD sense
of the distribution of parental income will raise the child’s independence threshold.
Therefore, the empirical estimates in Becker et al. (2005) would approximate a test
of the model provided, in the data, transfers took place among a small fraction of
parent and independent child pairs, and provided additionally that our inclusion of p
in the regressions were a valid way of controlling for FOSD. Regarding transfers, data
from Guiso and Japelli (2002) for the 1991 wave of the SHIW indicate that 25.9% of
households in their sample reported receiving a transfer from their parents or other
relatives. This total is split up into gifts — 5.6% — and bequests — 20.3%. The relevant
number for our analysis would correspond to the percentage of inter-vivos transfers or
gifts, which is indeed low.18
Concerning the validity of p as a control for FOSD, to the extent that father’s age and
schooling control for the father’s income level when employed, and since unemployment
benefits are proportional to previous wages in Italy, the degree of perceived job insecurity
measures (the complement of) the probability that the parent will get his full wages,
as opposed to the corresponding unemployment benefits. For this two-point support
distribution of parental income (employment wages versus unemployment benefits), a
reduction in perceived job insecurity exactly captures the notion of first-order stochastic
dominance used in the model.
We find strong and statistically significant effects of perceived parental insecurity
on the probability of independence. Specifically, if the parent’s perceived probability of
becoming (or remaining) unemployed went from 0 (full job security) to 1 (full job inse-
curity), the child’s probability of becoming independent would increase between 3.6 to
9.9 percentage points. Taking into account that the average probability of independence
in our sample is only 4%, these are considerable effects.
The micro data further allows us to test the model’s predictions concerning SOSD
18In the US, according to Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1996) who use the 1988 wave of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, the percentage of parent-child pairs for which transfers are given to children
varies between 20.3% to 24% (tables 1b and 1a, respectively).
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shifts in the distribution of parental income.19 The coefficient of variation of the dis-
tribution of parental income has a strong and statistically significant effect over the
probability of coresidence, as our model predicts. If the coefficient of variation went
from 0 to 50% of the mean, the child’s probability of coresidence would increase by 4.25
percentage points.
In our companion paper, we additionally test the impact of job insecurity on coresi-
dence at the macro level for a sample of European Union countries. Data on job insecu-
rity comes from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer. Once again, we find strong
and statistically significant effects of job insecurity on coresidence. If the percentage of
youth feeling insecure went from 0 to 100, the coresidence rate would increase by 13.6 to
18.2 percentage points; an identical change in the share of old workers feeling insecure
would generate a decrease in the coresidence rate of 16.3 to 19 percentage points. These
are sizable effects when compared to the average coresidence rate in our sample of 16%.
We interpret these results as broadly validating the model.
3 Conclusion
We have analyzed the effects of parental insecurity on the child’s residential choice un-
der a model of partial altruism and costly independence. Our results show that first-
and second-order stochastic dominance shifts in the distribution of the child’s (or the
parents’) future income do not necessarily produce the intuitive result of reducing (rais-
ing) the child’s income threshold for independence. Paradoxically, altruism is the very
source of this ambiguity. For selfish parents or if financial transfers between parents
and their adult children occur with very low probability (the latter effectively shutting
down the range of income values where altruism is operative), these results do emerge.
Similar conclusions follow for second-order stochastic dominance shifts in the income
distribution: lower variance in the child’s (parents’) future income raises (reduces) the
child’s threshold for independence provided transfers are not operative. Empirical esti-
19We get our measures of income uncertainty from Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002).
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mates using panel data for Italy and macroeconomic data for European Union countries
broadly confirm our predictions.
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